Ludwig Wittgenstein: Later Philosophy of Mathematics

Mathematics was a central and constant preoccupation for Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). He started in philosophy by reflecting on the nature of mathematics and logic; and, at the end of his life, his manuscripts on these topics amounted to thousands of pages, including notebooks and correspondence. In 1944, he said his primary contribution to philosophy was in the philosophy of mathematics. Yet his later views on mathematics have been less well received than his earlier conception, due to their anti-scientific, even anti-rationalist, spirit.

This article focuses on the relation between the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics and other philosophies of mathematics, especially Platonism; however, other doctrines (formalism, conventionalism, constructivism, empiricism) will be discussed as well.

Wittgenstein does not sympathize with any traditional philosophy of mathematics, and in particular his hostility toward Platonism (the conception that mathematics is about a-causal objects and mind-independent truths) is quite evident. This is in line with what can be described as his more general philosophical project: to expose deep conceptual confusions in the academic doctrines, rather than to defend his own doctrine. In fact, it is not even clear that the threads of his thinking on mathematics, when pulled together, amount to what we would today call a coherent, unified -ism. However, one view that can be attributed to him is that mathematical identities such as ‘Three times three is nine’ are not really propositions, as their superficial form indicates; but are certain kinds of rules; and, thus understood, the question is whether they are arbitrary or not. The interpretive position preferred in this article is that they are not, since they are grounded in empirical regularities – hence the recurrence of the theme of the applicability of mathematics in Wittgenstein’s later reflections on this topic.

Some have characterized him as a finitist-constructivist, others as a conventionalist, while many strongly disagree about these labels. He notoriously held the view that philosophy should be eminently descriptive, strongly opposing any interference with how mathematics is actually done (though he also predicted that lucid philosophy would curb the growth of certain
Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics-V.H. Klenk 2012-12-06 Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics have not received the recognition they deserve; they have for the most part been either ignored, or dismissed as unworthy of the author of the Tractatus and the Investigations. This is unfortunate, I believe, and not at all fair, for these remarks are not only enjoyable reading, as even the harshest critics have conceded, but also a rich and genuine source of insight into the nature of mathematics. It is perhaps the fact that they are more suggestive than systematic which has put so many people off; there is nothing here of formal derivation and very little attempt even at sustained and organized argumentation. The remarks are fragmentary and often obscure, if one does not recognize the point at which they are directed. Nevertheless, there is much here that is good, and even a fairly systematic and coherent account of mathematics. What I have tried to do in the following pages is to reconstruct the system behind the often rather disconnected commentary, and to show that when the theory emerges, most of the harsh criticism which has been directed against these remarks is seen to be without foundation. This is meant to be a sympathetic account of Wittgenstein's views on mathematics, and I hope that it will at least contribute to a further reading and reassessment of his contributions to the philosophy of mathematics.

Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics-Pasquale Frascolla 2006-12-05 Wittgenstein's role was vital in establishing mathematics as one of this century's principal areas of philosophic inquiry. In this book, the three phases of Wittgenstein's reflections on mathematics are viewed as a progressive whole, rather than as separate entities. Frascolla builds up a systematic construction of Wittgenstein's representation of the role of arithmetic in the theory of logical operations. He also presents a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations - the 'community view of internal relations'.


Bemerkungen ueber die Grundlagen der Mathematik-Ludwig Wittgenstein 1967 Added title page in German: Bemerkungen uber die Grundlagen der Mathematik.

Wittgenstein-Severin Schroeder 2006-03-31 This book offers a lucid and highly readable account of Wittgenstein's philosophy, framed against the background of his extraordinary life and character. Woven together with a biographical narrative, the chapters explain the key ideas of Wittgenstein's work, from his first book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to his mature masterpiece, the Philosophical Investigations. Severin Schroeder shows that at the core of Wittgenstein's later work lies a startlingly original and subversive conception of the nature of philosophy. In accordance with this conception, Wittgenstein offers no new philosophical doctrines to replace his earlier ones, but seeks to demonstrate how all philosophical theorizing is the result of conceptual misunderstanding. He first diagnoses such misunderstanding at the core of his own earlier philosophy of language and then subjects philosophical views and problems about various mental phenomena understanding, sensations, the will to a similar therapeutic analysis. Schroeder provides a clear and careful account of the main arguments offered by Wittgenstein. He concludes by considering some critical responses to Wittgenstein's work, assessing its legacy for contemporary philosophy. Wittgenstein is ideal for students seeking a clear and concise introduction to the work of this seminal twentieth-century philosopher.

Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics-Gabriele M. Mras 2019-11-18 This volume presents different conceptions of logic and mathematics and discuss their philosophical foundations and consequences. This concerns first of all topics of Wittgenstein's ideas on logic and mathematics; questions about the
complexity of propositions; the more recent debate about Neo-Logicism and Neo-Fregeanism; the comparison and translatability of different logics; the foundations of mathematics: intuitionism, mathematical realism, and formalism. The contributing authors are Matthias Baaz, Francesco Berto, Jean-Yves Beziau, Elena Dragalina-Chernya, Günther Eder, Susan Edwards-McKie, Oliver Feldmann, Juliet Floyd, Norbert Gratzl, Richard Heinrich, Janusz Kaczmarek, Wolfgang Kienzler, Timm Lampert, Itala Maria Loffredo D'Ottaviano, Paolo Mancosu, Matthieu Marion, Felix Mühlhölzer, Charles Parsons, Edi Pavlovic, Christoph Pflisterer, Michael Potter, Richard Raatzsch, Esther Ramharter, Stefan Riegelnik, Gabriel Sandu, Georg Schiemer, Gerhard Schurz, Dana Scott, Stewart Shapiro, Karl Sigmund, William W. Tait, Mark van Atten, Maria van der Schaar, Vladimir Vasyukov, Jan von Plato, Jan Woleński and Richard Zach.

Wittgenstein, Mathematics and World-Bob Clark 2017-11-14 This book uses Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical methodology to solve a problem that has perplexed thinkers for thousands of years: ‘how come (abstract) mathematics applies so wonderfully well to the (concrete, physical) world?’ The book is distinctive in several ways. First, it gives the reader a route into understanding important features of Wittgenstein’s writings and lectures by using his methodology to tackle this long-standing and seemingly intractable philosophical problem. More than this, though, it offers an outline of important (sometimes little-known) aspects of the development of mathematical thought through the ages, and an engagement of Wittgenstein’s philosophy with this and with contemporary philosophy of mathematics on its own terms. A clear overview of all this in the context of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is interesting in its own right; it is also just what is needed to solve the problem of mathematics and world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths-Jaakko Hintikka 2006-08-15 IF WITTGENSTEIN COULD TALK, COULD WE UNDERSTAND HIM? Perusing the secondary literature on Wittgenstein, I have frequently experienced a perfect Brechtian Entfremdungseffekt. This is interesting, I have felt like saying when reading books and papers on Wittgenstein, but who is the writer talking about? Certainly not Ludwig Wittgenstein the actual person who wrote his books and notebooks and whom I happened to meet. Why is there this strange gap between the ideas of the actual philosopher and the musings of his interpreters? Wittgenstein is talking to us through the posthumous publication of his writings. Why don’t philosophers understand what he is saying? A partial reason is outlined in the first essay of this volume. Wittgenstein was far too impatient to explain in his books and book drafts what his problems were, what it was that he was trying to get clear about. He was even too impatient to explain in full his earlier solutions, often merely referring to them casually as it were in a shorthand notation. For one important instance, in The Brown Book, Wittgenstein had explained in some detail what name-object relationships amount to in his view. There he offers both an explanation of what his problem is and an account of his own view illustrated by means of specific examples of language-games. But when he raises the same question again in Philosophical Investigations I, sec.

Wittgenstein, Finitism, and the Foundations of Mathematics-Mathieu Marion 1998 Mathieu Marion offers a careful, historically informed study of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. This area of his work has frequently been undervalued by Wittgenstein specialists and philosophers of mathematics alike; but the surprising fact that he wrote more on this subject than any other indicates its centrality in his thought. Marion traces the development of Wittgenstein’s thinking from the 1920s through to the 1950s, in the context of themathematical and philosophical work of the times, to make coherent sense of ideas that have too often been misunderstood because they have been presented in a disjointed and incomplete way. He shows that study of Wittgenstein’s writings on mathematics is essential to a proper understanding of his philosophy, and also that it can do much to illuminate current debates about the foundations of mathematics.

Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics-Crispin Wright 1994 In this detailed account, Crispin Wright offers a systematic account of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics and establishes its links with his later philosophy of language. In line with this, he examines Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.
The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein-Oskari Kuusela 2011-10-27 Since the middle of the 20th century Ludwig Wittgenstein has been an exceptionally influential and controversial figure wherever philosophy is studied. This is a comprehensive volume on Wittgenstein where 35 scholars explore the whole range of his thought, offering critical engagement and original interpretation.

The Textual Genesis of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations-Nuno Venturinha 2013-09-11 Sixty years after its first edition, there is an increasing consensus among scholars that the work posthumously published as Philosophical Investigations represents something that is far from a complete picture of Wittgenstein’s second book project. G.H. von Wright’s seminal research on the Nachlass was an important contribution in this direction, showing that the Wittgenstein papers can reveal much more than the source of specific remarks. This book specifically explores Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations from the different angles of its originary conceptions, including the mathematical texts, shedding new light on fundamental issues in twentieth century and contemporary philosophy. Leading authorities in the field focus on newly published or hitherto unpublished sources for the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later work and a Wittgenstein typescript, translated for the first time into English, is included as an appendix.

Why Is There Philosophy of Mathematics At All?-Ian Hacking 2014-01-30 This truly philosophical book takes us back to fundamentals - the sheer experience of proof, and the enigmatic relation of mathematics to nature. It asks unexpected questions, such as 'what makes mathematics mathematics?', 'where did proof come from and how did it evolve?', and 'how did the distinction between pure and applied mathematics come into being?' In a wide-ranging discussion that is both immersed in the past and unusually attuned to the competing philosophical ideas of contemporary mathematicians, it shows that proof and other forms of mathematical exploration continue to be living, evolving practices - responsive to new technologies, yet embedded in permanent (and astonishing) facts about human beings. It distinguishes several distinct types of application of mathematics, and shows how each leads to a different philosophical conundrum. Here is a remarkable body of new philosophical thinking about proofs, applications, and other mathematical activities.

Wittgenstein on Mathematics-Severin Schroeder 2020-12-30 This book offers a detailed account and discussion of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. In Part I, the stage is set with a brief presentation of Frege’s logicist attempt to provide arithmetic with a foundation and Wittgenstein’s criticisms of it, followed by sketches of Wittgenstein’s early views of mathematics, in the Tractatus and in the early 1930s. Then (in Part II), Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy of mathematics (1937-44) is carefully presented and examined. Schroeder explains that it is based on two key ideas: the calculus view and the grammar view. On the one hand, mathematics is seen as a human activity — calculation — rather than a theory. On the other hand, the results of mathematical calculations serve as grammatical norms. The following chapters (on mathematics as grammar; rule-following; conventionalism; the empirical basis of mathematics; the role of proof) explore the tension between those two key ideas and suggest a way in which it can be resolved. Finally, there are chapters analysing and defending Wittgenstein’s provocative views on Hilbert’s Formalism and the quest for consistency proofs and on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

Rails to Infinity-Crispin Wright 2001 This volume, published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein’s death, brings together thirteen of Crispin Wright’s most influential essays on Wittgenstein’s later philosophies of language and mind, many hard to obtain, including the first publication of his Whitehead Lectures given at Harvard in 1996. Organized into four groups, the essays focus on issues about following a rule and the objectivity of meaning; on Saul Kripke’s contribution to the interpretation of Wittgenstein; on privacy and self-knowledge; and on aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics. Wright uses the cutting edge of Wittgenstein’s thought to expose and undermine the common assumptions in platonistic views of mathematical and logical objectivity and Cartesian ideas about self-knowledge. The great question remains: How to react to the demise of these assumptions? In response, the essays develop a concerted, evolving approach to the possibilities—and limitations—of constructive philosophies of mathematics and mind. Their collection constitutes a major statement by one of Britain’s most important philosophers—and will provide an indispensable tool both for students of Wittgenstein and for scholars working more generally in the
metaphysics of mind and language.

A Companion to Wittgenstein-Hans-Johann Glock 2017-01-30 The most comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein’s thought yet compiled, this volume of fifty newly commissioned essays by leading interpreters of his philosophy is a keynote addition to the Blackwell series on the world’s great philosophers, covering everything from Wittgenstein’s intellectual development to the latest interpretations of his hugely influential ideas. The lucid, engaging commentary also reviews Wittgenstein’s historical legacy and his continued impact on contemporary philosophical debate.

Principia Mathematica-Alfred North Whitehead 1912

Philosophical Remarks-Ludwig Wittgenstein 1980-10-15 When in May 1930, the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, had to decide whether to renew Wittgenstein’s research grant, it turned to Bertrand Russell for an assessment of the work Wittgenstein had been doing over the past year. His verdict: "The theories contained in this new work . . . are novel, very original and indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician who likes simplicity, I should like to think that they are not, but from what I have read of them I am quite sure that he ought to have an opportunity to work them out, since, when completed, they may easily prove to constitute a whole new philosophy." [Philosophical Remarks] contains the seeds of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mind and of mathematics. Principally, he here discusses the role of indispensable in language, criticizing Russell’s The Analysis of Mind. He modifies the Tractatus’s picture theory of meaning by stressing that the connection between the proposition and reality is not found in the picture itself. He analyzes generality in and out of mathematics, and the notions of proof and experiment. He formulates a pain/private-language argument and discusses both behaviorism and the verifiability principle. The work is difficult but important, and it belongs in every philosophy collection."—Robert Hoffman, Philosophy "Any serious student of Wittgenstein’s work will want to study his Philosophical Remarks as a transitional book between his two great masterpieces. The Remarks is thus indispensable for anyone who seeks a complete understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy."—Leonard Linsky, American Philosophical Association

Wittgenstein and Naturalism-Kevin M. Cahill 2018-01-17 Wittgenstein was centrally concerned with the puzzling nature of the mind, mathematics, morality and modality. He also developed innovative views about the status and methodology of philosophy and was explicitly opposed to crudely "scientistic" worldviews. His later thought has thus often been understood as elaborating a nuanced form of naturalism appealing to such notions as "form of life", "primitive reactions", "natural history", "general facts of nature" and "common behaviour of mankind". And yet, Wittgenstein is strangely absent from much of the contemporary literature on naturalism and naturalising projects. This is the first collection of essays to focus explicitly on the relationship between Wittgenstein and naturalism. The volume is divided into four sections, each of which addresses a different aspect of naturalism and its relation to Wittgenstein's thought. The first section considers how naturalism could or should be understood. The second section deals with some of the main problematic domains—consciousness, meaning, mathematics—that philosophers have typically sought to naturalise. The third section explores ways in which the conceptual nature of human life might be continuous in important respects with animals. The final section is concerned with the naturalistic status and methodology of philosophy itself. This book thus casts a fresh light on many classical philosophical issues and brings Wittgensteinian ideas to bear on a number of current debates—for example experimental philosophy, neo-pragmatism and animal cognition/ethics—in which naturalism is playing a central role.

The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy-Gordon Hunnings 1988-01-01 This book explores the interrelated concepts of representation and grammar in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Throughout his life, Wittgenstein was obsessed with the problem of the nature of language and the relationship between language and the world. His intellectual journey, one of the most compelling in twentieth century thought, is the detailed adventure told by Gordon Hunnings in The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. This book surveys Wittgenstein’s elucidation of how the world is represented in
language, including the posthumously published material of his middle period. Early in his career, Wittgenstein's answer to the problem explored the representational connection between language and the world through the analogy of propositions as logical pictures of facts. Later, his mature answer elucidated the concept of the world as a construction of logical grammar. Hunnings shows how these shifting images of reality reflected in language also mirror the changes in Wittgenstein's philosophy.


The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein - Hans Sluga 2017-12-28 Updated edition of this important book, charting the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy of the mind, language, logic, and mathematics.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic - Stewart Shapiro 2005-02-10 Mathematics and logic have been central topics of concern since the dawn of philosophy. Since logic is the study of correct reasoning, it is a fundamental branch of epistemology and a priority in any philosophical system. Philosophers have focused on mathematics as a case study for general philosophical issues and for its role in overall knowledge-gathering. Today, philosophy of mathematics and logic remain central disciplines in contemporary philosophy, as evidenced by the regular appearance of articles on these topics in the best mainstream philosophical journals; in fact, the last decade has seen an explosion of scholarly work in these areas. This volume covers these disciplines in a comprehensive and accessible manner, giving the reader an overview of the major problems, positions, and battle lines. The 26 contributed chapters are by established experts in the field, and their articles contain both exposition and criticism as well as substantial development of their own positions. The essays, which are substantially self-contained, serve both to introduce the reader to the subject and to engage in it at its frontiers. Certain major positions are represented by two chapters—one supportive and one critical. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Math and Logic is a ground-breaking reference like no other in its field. It is a central resource to those wishing to learn about the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of logic, or some aspect thereof, and to those who actively engage in the discipline, from advanced undergraduates to professional philosophers, mathematicians, and historians.

Taking Wittgenstein at His Word - Robert J. Fogelin 2020-04-28 Taking Wittgenstein at His Word is an experiment in reading organized around a central question: What kind of interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy emerges if we adhere strictly to his claims that he is not in the business of presenting and defending philosophical theses and that his only aim is to expose persistent conceptual misunderstandings that lead to deep philosophical perplexities? Robert Fogelin draws out the therapeutic aspects of Wittgenstein's later work by closely examining his account of rule-following and how he applies the idea in the philosophy of mathematics. The first of the book's two parts focuses on rule-following, Wittgenstein's "paradox of interpretation," and his naturalistic response to this paradox, all of which are persistent and crucial features of his later philosophy. Fogelin offers a corrective to the frequent misunderstanding that the paradox of interpretation is a paradox about meaning, and he emphasizes the importance of Wittgenstein's often undervalued appeals to natural responses. The second half of the book examines how Wittgenstein applies his reflections on rule-following to the status of mathematical propositions, proofs, and objects, leading to remarkable, demystifying results. Taking Wittgenstein at His Word shows that what Wittgenstein claims to be doing and what he actually does are much closer than is often recognized. In doing so, the book underscores fundamental—but frequently underappreciated—insights about Wittgenstein's later philosophy.


Aspect Perception after Wittgenstein - Michael Beaney 2018-01-03 This volume brings together new essays that consider Wittgenstein's treatment of the phenomenon of aspect perception in relation to the broader idea
of conceptual novelty; that is, the acquisition or creation of new concepts, and the application of an acquired understanding in unfamiliar or novel situations. Over the last twenty years, aspect perception has received increasing philosophical attention, largely related to applying Wittgenstein’s remarks on the phenomena of seeing-as, found in Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1953), to issues within philosophical aesthetics. Seeing-as, however, has come to occupy a broader conceptual category, particularly in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. The essays in this volume examine the exegetical issues arising within Wittgenstein studies, while also considering the broader utility and implications of the phenomenon of seeing-as in the fields of aesthetics, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of mathematics, with a thematic focus on questions of novelty and creativity. The collection constitutes a fruitful interpretative engagement with the later Wittgenstein, as well as a unique contribution to considerations of philosophical methodology.

**Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics** Juliet Floyd 2021-07-31 For Wittgenstein mathematics is a human activity characterizing ways of seeing conceptual possibilities and empirical situations, proof and logical methods central to its progress. Sentences exhibit differing ‘aspects’, or dimensions of meaning, projecting mathematical ‘realities’. Mathematics is an activity of constructing standpoints on equalities and differences of these. Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mathematics (1934-1951) grew from his Early (1912-1921) and Middle (1929-33) philosophies, a dialectical path reconstructed here partly as a response to the limitative results of Gödel and Turing.

**Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy** Paul Horwich 2012-12-13 Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.

**Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind** S. Schroeder 2001-01-01 Each essay in this volume discusses some prevalent views in contemporary philosophy of mind by confronting them with Wittgensteinian ideas. Part One addresses the views of Quine and Dennett, including functionalism, eliminative materialism and the current debate about consciousness. Part Two assembles essays that focus each on one particular psychological concept, namely thinking, imagining, sensation, knowledge and reason.

**Wittgenstein in the 1930s** David G. Stern 2018-10-04 Shows the importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy in the 1930s, in its own right and for his philosophy as a whole.

**Ludwig Wittgenstein: The later Wittgenstein : from Philosophical investigations to On certainty** Stuart Shanker 2002 Wittgenstein scholarship has continued to grow at a pace few could have anticipated - a testament both to the fertility of his thought and to the thriving state of contemporary philosophy. In response to this ever-growing interest in the field, we are delighted to announce the publication of a second series of critical assessments on Wittgenstein, emphasising both the breadth and depth of contemporary Wittgenstein research. As well as papers on the nature and method of Wittgenstein's philosophy, this second collection also relates to a broader range of topics, including psychology, politics, art, music and culture.

**Godel's Theorem in Focus** S.G. Shanker 2012-08-21 A layman's guide to the mechanics of Gödel's proof together with a lucid discussion of the issues which it raises. Includes an essay discussing the significance of Gödel's work in the light of Wittgenstein's criticisms.

**Wittgenstein: A Guide for the Perplexed** Mark Addis 2006-03-23 Continuum's Guides for the Perplexed are clear, concise and accessible introductions to thinkers, writers and subjects that students and readers can find especially challenging. Concentrating specifically on what it is that makes the subject difficult to fathom, these books explain and explore key themes and ideas, guiding the reader towards a thorough understanding of
demanding material. Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most influential twentieth century philosophers with his ideas occupying a central place in the history and study of modern philosophy. Students will inevitably encounter his major contributions to the philosophies of language, mind, logic and mathematics. However, there is no escaping the extent of the challenge posed by Wittgenstein whose complex ideas are often enigmatically expressed. Wittgenstein: A Guide for the Perplexed is an authoritative, comprehensive and lucid commentary on the philosophy of this eminent modern thinker. It offers sound guidance to reading Wittgenstein and a valuable methodology for interpreting his works. The illuminating text covers the entirety of Wittgenstein’s thought, examining the relationship between the early, middle and late periods of his philosophy. Detailed attention is paid to Wittgenstein’s great works the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, as well as to other published writings. Valuably, the guide also covers ground not commonly explored in studies of Wittgenstein, including his contributions to aesthetics and philosophy of religion. This is the most thorough and fully engaged account of Wittgenstein available - an invaluable resource for students and anyone interested in philosophy and modern intellectual history.

The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy-Jose Medina 2002-07-17 Explores the stable core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as developed from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations.

Wittgenstein’s Annotations to Hardy’s Course of Pure Mathematics-Juliet Floyd 2020-08-31 This monograph examines the private annotations that Ludwig Wittgenstein made to his copy of G.H. Hardy’s classic textbook, A Course of Pure Mathematics. Complete with actual images of the annotations, it gives readers a more complete picture of Wittgenstein’s remarks on irrational numbers, which have only been published in an excerpted form and, as a result, have often been unjustly criticized. The authors first establish the context behind the annotations and discuss the historical role of Hardy’s textbook. They then go on to outline Wittgenstein’s non-extensionalist point of view on real numbers, assessing his manuscripts and published remarks and discussing attitudes in play in the philosophy of mathematics since Dedekind. Next, coverage focuses on the annotations themselves. The discussion encompasses irrational numbers, the law of excluded middle in mathematics and the notion of an “improper picture,” the continuum of real numbers, and Wittgenstein’s attitude toward functions and limits.

Philosophical Grammar-Ludwig Wittgenstein 1978 In 1933 Ludwig Wittgenstein revised a manuscript he had compiled from his 1930-1932 notebooks, but the work as a whole was not published until 1969, as Philosophische Grammatik. This first English translation clearly reveals the central place Philosophical Grammar occupies in Wittgenstein’s thought and provides a link from his earlier philosophy to his later views.

Frank Ramsey-Cheryl Misak 2020-02-13 When he died in 1930 aged 26, Frank Ramsey had already invented one branch of mathematics and two branches of economics, laying the foundations for decision theory and game theory. Keynes deferred to him; he was the only philosopher whom Wittgenstein treated as an equal. Had he lived he might have been recognized as the most brilliant thinker of the century. This amiable shambling bear of a man was an ardent socialist, a believer in free love, and an intimate of the Bloomsbury set. For the first time Cheryl Misak tells the full story of his extraordinary life.

Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics-Virginia H. Klenk 1972

Theories in and of Mathematics Education-Angelika Bikner-Ahsbahs 2016-08-05 This survey provides an overview of German meta-discourse on theories and mathematics education as a scientific discipline, from the 1970s to the 1990s. Two theory strands are offered: a semiotic view related to Peirce and Wittgenstein (presented by Willibald Dörfler), and the theory of learning activity by Joachim Lompscher (presented by Regina Bruder and Oliver Schmitt). By networking the two theoretical approaches in a case study of learning fractions, it clarifies the nature of the two theories, how they can be related to inform practice and renew TME-issues for mathematics education as a scientific discipline. Hans-Georg Steiner initiated the first of five
international conferences on Theories of Mathematics Education (TME) to advance the founding of mathematics education as a scientific discipline, and subsequently German researchers have continued to focus on TME topics but within various theory strands.

**WITTGENSTEINIAN (adj.)**-Shyam Wuppuluri 2019-11-22 “Tell me,” Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?” His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?" What would it have looked like if we looked at all sciences from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? Wittgenstein is undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His complex body of work has been analysed by numerous scholars, from mathematicians and physicists, to philosophers, linguists, and beyond. This volume brings together some of his central perspectives as applied to the modern sciences and studies the influence they may have on the thought processes underlying science and on the world view it engenders. The contributions stem from leading scholars in philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics, psychology and human sciences; all of them have written in an accessible style that demands little specialist knowledge, whilst clearly portraying and discussing the deep issues at hand.

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